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# REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 1190 (1998) of 13 August 1998, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to submit, by 31 August 1998, a report with recommendations regarding the future role of the United Nations in Angola. It covers developments since my last report of 6 August 1998 (S/1998/723).

## II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. In view of the precarious situation in Angola and in an attempt to put the peace process back on track, I asked Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria) to visit Angola and some neighbouring countries as my Special Envoy to assess the various aspects of the situation in the country and advise me on the possible course of action. Mr. Brahimi visited Angola from 31 July to 8 August 1998 and travelled to Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Zambia between 8 and 15 August. The crisis which erupted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) prevented my Special Envoy from visiting Kinshasa.

3. During his stay in Angola, Mr. Brahimi held extensive consultations with the Angolan Government, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and United States of America), as well as other parties and personalities concerned, to review the status of the Angolan peace process, to explore ways and means to create an atmosphere conducive to the resumption of a meaningful dialogue between the signatories to the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex) and to overcome the current crisis.

4. On 3 August 1998, Mr. Brahimi was received by President José Eduardo dos Santos, who expressed his frustration and deep concern over the dangerous impasse in the peace process, as a result of UNITA's non-compliance with its major commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. In an attempt to improve the political climate, and responding to Mr. Brahimi's appeal, President dos Santos promised to encourage the Luanda media to reduce anti-UNITA propaganda. On the following day, Mr. Brahimi met in Andulo with the

UNITA leader, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, who reiterated his commitment to the peace process and promised to send back to Luanda the head of the UNITA delegation to the Joint Commission. Mr. Savimbi claimed that UNITA had transferred some 272 localities to the Government, but the Angolan National Police (ANP) and the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) had forcefully expelled all UNITA cadres and supporters from 260 of those areas. Mr. Savimbi also claimed that the Angolan authorities intended to dismantle the UNITA party structures and that they had killed, arrested and tortured many UNITA members. The Angolan authorities denied these accusations, arguing that UNITA had actually ordered its members to withdraw from those localities. They also accused UNITA of reoccupying 90 areas it had surrendered, killing during the takeover many Government police officers and other local officials. My Special Envoy impressed upon Mr. Savimbi the urgent need to cooperate fully in the extension of State administration to the strategic localities of Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo and N'harea. In this regard, Mr. Brahimi expressed the view that the sanctions imposed on UNITA by the Security Council were not likely to be lifted or reduced unless UNITA fully honoured its commitments. Mr. Brahimi strongly urged the UNITA leader to proceed with the effective demilitarization of its armed forces, an indispensable element of the Lusaka Protocol.

5. A few days later, hostile propaganda in the Angolan State media was slightly reduced, while the head of the UNITA delegation to the Joint Commission returned to Luanda on 6 August 1998 after a few months' absence. At the meeting held by the Joint Commission on 7 August, UNITA presented new proposals on the extension of State administration to the four strongholds by 15 October 1998. The Government made a counter-proposal, which called for the full demilitarization of UNITA, the installation of its leadership in Luanda and the extension of State administration to the four localities by 31 August. On the basis of these two proposals, the Officer-in-Charge and the Force Commander of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), Major-General Seth Kofi Obeng, in consultation with the representatives of the Troika and New York Headquarters, presented to the parties a compromise programme of activities which set 15 September 1998 as the deadline by which Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo and N'harea should be transferred to the Government's authority.

6. This programme was also aimed at improving the political atmosphere which is needed to promote genuine dialogue between the two parties, in particular in the areas where State administration had been established, and stabilizing the security situation throughout the country. To achieve these goals, the programme called for: the implementation of a number of pressing measures, including the reduction of hostile propaganda; the return of senior UNITA officials to Luanda; the return of both local Government authorities and UNITA functionaries to the areas which they had left as a result of the deterioration of the security conditions; and the immediate cessation of all acts of violence and the determination of the modalities for the rapid conclusion of the demilitarization process. While the Government expressed its willingness to accept this programme, UNITA rejected its provisions about the conclusion of the demilitarization process. In this connection, UNITA recalled that it had twice made declarations on the demilitarization of its forces.

7. During his visit to the countries of the region, my Special Envoy met with several leaders, including the Prime Minister of Namibia, Mr. Hage G. Geingob, the President of Zimbabwe, Mr. Robert Mugabe, the Vice-President of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, the President of Zambia, Mr. Frederick Chiluba, and other senior officials. While soliciting their views on the situation in Angola as well as the future role of the United Nations in that country, Mr. Brahimi impressed upon the leaders of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with whom he met, the need for SADC to enhance its direct support to the Angolan peace process. The SADC leaders expressed mounting concern at the dangerous deterioration of the situation in Angola which might further jeopardize stability in the region, as well as their readiness to consider a more active role in resolving the current crisis. At the same time, Mr. Brahimi's interlocutors were unanimous in supporting a continued United Nations presence in Angola and felt that the current crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was likely to seriously affect the situation in the country. While the Government of Angola made several public statements explaining the reasons for its involvement in the Democratic Republic at the request of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, UNITA issued a communiqué deploring the intervention and claiming that it also "had interests to protect" in that country.

8. The continued absence of many senior UNITA members from the capital and subsequent return of the hostile anti-UNITA tone in the Luanda mass media have compounded the general situation in the country. Equally, the declaration made on 24 August by the UNITA leadership concerning the severance of "all cooperation with the Troika countries" for allegedly being partial in the peace process also contributed to the growing tensions. However, despite that statement, a UNITA delegation participated in two follow-up meetings of the Joint Commission, which were attended by the representatives of the three observer States.

9. On 31 August 1998, the Angolan authorities decided to suspend UNITA members from the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation and from the National Assembly because of UNITA's non-compliance with its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It should be noted that the contacts between the Government and UNITA have virtually ceased at the local level and are currently limited to interaction in the Joint Commission in Luanda.

10. In a related development, Mr. Jorge Valentim, who was suspended by the Government, together with other UNITA members in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, made a press statement in Luanda on 2 September 1998 to the effect that a number of UNITA senior members had decided to form a group with the objective of "democratizing" UNITA; this new group has created a "temporary leadership" of the party and will continue with the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. In a communiqué dated 3 September 1998, the Government of Angola expressed its support to the group and called on the international community to recognize it. Subsequently, the new group, which calls itself the Renovation Committee of UNITA, appointed a new head of the UNITA delegation to the Joint Commission to replace Mr. Samakuva, who has reportedly left Luanda for Lisbon. The newly established Committee is also requesting the convening, with its participation, of an urgent meeting of the Joint Commission. In the meantime, the Government insists that MONUA should cease its contacts with

Mr. Savimbi and has warned the United Nations of the possible intensification of military operations throughout Angola.

11. In the meantime, I have decided to appoint Mr. Issa B. Y. Diallo (Guinea) as my new Special Representative for Angola. Mr. Diallo, who arrived in Luanda on 28 August 1998, joined me in Durban, South Africa, on 31 August to attend the Summit of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

12. During the Summit, I held extensive discussions on the situation in Angola with President dos Santos and SADC leaders, as well as the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The President of Angola reiterated his commitment to the Lusaka Protocol, but strongly deplored the current dangerous impasse created by UNITA's non-compliance with its obligations under the Protocol. The SADC leaders were deeply concerned at the worsening situation and its possible spill-over into neighbouring countries. Most of them confirmed their readiness to increase their support to the restoration of peace in Angola and the full implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. The SADC leaders, who were expected to consider the Angolan issue at their meeting in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe on 7 September, called for a continued presence of the United Nations in Angola to assist its people in promoting national reconciliation.

## III. MILITARY AND POLICE ASPECTS

13. In the meantime, the security situation in the country remained very tense. UNITA forces continued to threaten the positions of FAA and ANP in Uige, Cuanza Norte, Malange, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Moxico and Bié provinces. Furthermore, UNITA forces seem to have embarked upon a systematic campaign to regain control over some diamond-mining areas and attacking settlements in Malange and Lunda Norte provinces. Subsequently, government troops have launched counter-attacks and claim to have retaken several localities after intense fighting. The Government also claims that scores of civilians were killed as a result of these operations, which were started by UNITA on 7 August. While MONUA has been prevented from visiting the affected areas on the pretext of concerns for the safety of its personnel, MONUA team sites in the areas of Luzamba and Malange reported that some injured FAA soldiers had been evacuated to Luanda.

14. Meanwhile, reinforcements of FAA and ANP continued to arrive in these vital areas. In addition to reinforcing the diamond mining locations, they have resorted to laying protective minefields around their positions in the towns of Luena, Saurimo, Malange, Quibaxe, Uige and Kuito. On the other hand, MONUA continues to report intensive mine laying activity conducted by UNITA, as well as numerous attacks and ambushes perpetrated by its "residual" forces against the civilian population and local government officials. Both parties continued to concentrate their forces in other strategic locations, and large movements of government troops were observed in areas along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, presumably in connection with their operation in that country.

15. The escalation of tensions in Angola has seriously affected the activities of MONUA. However, the Mission continued to monitor, to the extent possible, the military and security situation and to investigate allegations, despite lack

of cooperation on the ground and restrictions imposed on the movement of the United Nations police and military observers. The recently relocated United Nations team sites have to rely mostly on air or ground patrols, operating under the protection of the United Nations troops. In view of the high number of ambushes and new mine-laying, additional protective measures have been taken to ensure the security of United Nations personnel, which include restrictions concerning road movements. At the same time MONUA has continued, whenever possible, to extend its assistance in the provinces to United Nations programmes and agencies in order to allow them to carry out essential humanitarian tasks. The strength of the military component of the Mission now stands at a total of 724 personnel, with three infantry companies (414 personnel), a helicopter, medical and signals units, 90 military observers and 41 staff officers. The strength of the civilian police component (CIVPOL) currently stands at 401 observers.

## IV. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

16. During the reporting period, the human rights situation has further worsened. The increase in military operations has resulted in a rise in the number of reported human rights violations, particularly in Lunda Norte and Malange provinces. These have included summary executions, as well as numerous attacks against the civilian population and local officials. The mass killings of at least 105 individuals and the injuries to numerous inhabitants of the mining settlement of Bula (Lunda Norte province) by unidentified elements on 21 July constituted the most serious incident and continues to be under MONUA's investigation. The attacks on Cambo-Sungingi and Cunda-Dia-Baze in Malange by heavily armed individuals on 7 and 8 August resulted in numerous deaths, including the summary executions of at least nine individuals, three of whom held foreign citizenship. The armed attacks have generated an increased flow of internally displaced persons, some of whom suffered further abuses and harassment, including theft of their belongings, at the hands of armed elements belonging to the two parties.

17. Various allegations continued to be received of abuses committed against UNITA demobilized soldiers, UNITA officials and other perceived sympathizers. Arbitrary arrests, torture or harassment and even cases of "disappearance" and deaths in custody following arrest continued to be investigated by MONUA, particularly in Cuanza Norte, Uige, Lunda Sul and Bié provinces. Human rights violations have also been reported in the context of renewed recruitment efforts by both sides in many parts of the country. However, lack of access to UNITA-controlled areas made it very difficult to investigate allegations against UNITA, and has prevented discussion about how to promote human rights throughout the country.

18. At the same time, the issues relevant to human rights continued to be considered in the Joint Commission which, on several occasions, stressed the importance, even in the current difficult period, of strengthening the system of justice. Also, the Joint Commission welcomed the fact that there was a willingness and openness by those involved to work with MONUA in this important area.

## V. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

### A. Relief and rehabilitation

19. The political impasse, the deteriorating security conditions and natural calamities have had a major impact on the humanitarian situation in Angola, with the total number of affected population growing daily. Since the beginning of 1998, more than 142,000 new internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been registered, out of which 108,000 have received assistance from the humanitarian community. The total number of new and old IDPs is estimated at 1.3 million. Displacement of civilian population is occurring in areas which were previously not affected, including in Kwanza Sul, Namibe and Cunene provinces. The current humanitarian situation is not likely to improve rapidly, in view of the fact that these new IDPs have been forced to leave their places of origin without their belongings, tools and seeds. As a result, the majority of IDPs will not be able to cultivate crops during the current planting season, hence perpetuating the vicious circle of dependency on humanitarian assistance.

20. Furthermore, several thousands of the Angolan people are reported to have fled to the neighbouring countries of Zambia, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the same time, the current conflict in the latter country has also led to an influx of Congolese to the northern areas of Angola.

21. The outbreak of a meningitis epidemic, mentioned in my previous report to the Council (S/1998/723), has not been contained and is now spreading rapidly. Lack of access to the affected populations, especially in Malange, Bié and Huambo provinces, has prevented the humanitarian community from carrying out effective vaccination campaigns and from providing timely medical assistance. In addition, insufficient rainfall at crucial stages of crop development has resulted in severe drought and crop failure, threatening civilian populations with hunger in the southern provinces of Cunene and Cuando-Cubango.

22. Although medical supplies and food stocks available to the humanitarian community are sufficient to respond to the current caseload, actual provision of humanitarian assistance has been limited owing to prevailing insecurity. Several indiscriminate attacks perpetrated recently against civilians and relief workers have led MONUA to advise United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to restrict their movements and to remain mostly in provincial capitals. Consequently, there has been a substantial decrease in the capacity of humanitarian organizations to assist those in need. The drawdown of MONUA's formed military units has resulted in a further decrease of many humanitarian activities, which had previously been escorted by MONUA. In view of the high level of insecurity and the need for protection of the United Nations and non-governmental staff, it is important that vital humanitarian operations continue to be escorted by MONUA infantry units to the extent possible.

23. The continuation of humanitarian programmes in Angola is also in jeopardy, owing to the poor response to the 1998 inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal and other funding mechanisms. Pledges and contributions total only 36.9 per cent of the $91 million requested. United Nations agencies and NGOs lack sufficient resources to support their long range programmes. These include transportation

of humanitarian cargo, support to over 1 million IDPs, as well as health and nutrition programmes for vulnerable groups. Some humanitarian organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are considering closing down their operations in Angola. It is important that the donor community continue to contribute generously to the programmes in the country in order to support at this crucial time not only the civilian population in need but also the whole peace process.

### B. Demining

24. The deterioration of security conditions has had a negative impact on the mine action activities in most parts of the country. Restrictions imposed on the freedom of movement of international staff and provincial government authorities have led to a suspension of all demining operations in Malange, Huambo and Moxico provinces. All demining brigades have been withdrawn and now remain in areas near provincial capitals. Despite the grave humanitarian problem generated by the increase in mine-laying activities, efforts should be made to keep proper mine-field records in accordance with international rules to facilitate the detection of mines when conditions would permit.

## VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

25. There have been no significant changes in the macroeconomic difficulties facing Angola. The high level of inflation, overvalued currency and fiscal deficit remained critical problems affecting the country. Prices of goods and services remain exceedingly high for the average consumer, and there are serious risks that inflation will once again begin to increase rapidly. The gap between the official and unofficial exchange rates continued to widen, discouraging domestic production and leading to a situation whereby foreign currency is used side by side with the national one, in both official and private transactions.

26. The economic difficulties continued to be compounded by the low price of oil on the world market, which affects the overall performance of the economy and the Government's financial resources. With the precarious military situation, the social sector is the most affected by the cuts in public expenditures. Moreover, an increasing number of Angolans continued to suffer from the lack of social services, while unemployment remained high. As a result, the labour force has been increasingly moving into the informal sector.

27. The Government has begun a series of consultations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) aimed at allowing the Fund to monitor the government medium-term programme for stabilization of economic recovery, which could establish the basis for future operations of IMF in Angola. The Government is also being urged by donors to adopt a structural adjustment programme, and the World Bank, IMF and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continued to assist Angola in capacity-building programmes and economic management.

## VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

28. As indicated in my report of 16 March 1998 (A/52/799/Add.1), the proposed budget for the maintenance of MONUA for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 is estimated at $140.8 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of $11.7 million gross. Pending the submission of further recommendations on the United Nations presence in Angola after 30 June 1998, the General Assembly, by its resolution 52/8 C of 26 June 1998, appropriated an initial amount of US$ 43.6 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of $10.9 million gross, for the period from 1 July to 31 October 1998.

29. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MONUA, as recommended in paragraph 37 below, the balance of the requirements for the maintenance of the Mission, as contained in my report of 16 March 1998, will be sought from the General Assembly at the regular part of its fifty-third session.

30. As at 31 August 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (UNAVEM) and MONUA for the period from the inception of UNAVEM to 15 August 1998 amounted to $130.2 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 31 August 1998 was $1,814.6 million.

## VIII. OBSERVATIONS

31. Notwithstanding Security Council resolution 1190 (1998) of 13 August, the situation in Angola, as is evident, has continued to deteriorate. It is clear that the current stalemate in the peace process is mainly the result of persisting delays by UNITA in fulfilling its major obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. Despite the strenuous efforts of my Special Envoy, Mr. Brahimi, in cooperation with MONUA, the three observer States and other Governments concerned, including those in the region, tensions in the country have increased sharply, and both parties seem to be preparing themselves for a confrontation.

32. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has brought a new dimension to the crisis and complicated further the situation in Angola, as evidenced by the involvement of the Angolan military units in that country. In addition, the recent decision to suspend the UNITA members of the Government and the National Assembly raised doubts about the prospects for national reconciliation, without which there can be no lasting peace.

33. The United Nations is facing a crucial dilemma. With the assistance of the international community, a great deal has been achieved in Angola during the past three and a half years, not least the fact that the country has enjoyed a period of relative peace. However, if the current pervasive insecurity were to continue, the United Nations would be forced to reduce further its presence in Angola. Moreover, MONUA would not be able to remain in Angola in case of a major military confrontation or if the parties, in particular UNITA, were to continue to fail to complete their pending tasks under the Lusaka Protocol, including the full demilitarization of UNITA forces, the extension of State

administration throughout the country, the disarming of the civilian population and the pursuit of a genuine democratization process.

34. As my Special Envoy indicated to both sides during his visit to Angola and neighbouring countries, a number of urgent steps need to be taken to restore the peace process and expedite its conclusion. These include the immediate cessation of military operations, the reduction of hostile propaganda and the resumption of cooperation between the Government and UNITA, at the national and local levels. This could obviously be facilitated if both local government authorities and UNITA officials returned to areas which they left recently. The parties must also commit themselves to curbing violence.

35. Simultaneously, it is imperative that UNITA agree to complete the extension of State administration, including in Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo and N'harea. UNITA must also agree to dismantle its "residual" forces without further delay, and to become an effective political party. On the other hand, the Government must establish an effective political and security environment in which UNITA would have no reason to fear the consequences of its transformation into a genuine political party. I should like to emphasize that these requirements should not be interpreted as a suggestion that the Lusaka Protocol be renegotiated, but, rather, as a reaffirmation of the need to respect, fully and sincerely, the letter and the spirit of that agreement.

36. It should also be stressed in this connection that, while the international community understands the calls for a level political playing field and genuine reconciliation, it cannot accept UNITA's continuing claim to maintain its own armed elements and to control parts of the country. National reconciliation can only be achieved through respect for the rule of law and mutual accommodation. It cannot be pursued through half-hearted measures, delaying tactics or false promises.

37. It is in this spirit that I appeal to the Government and UNITA to refrain from any action that is likely to further complicate the already difficult situation in the country. I would also like to remind the Government of its responsibility of ensuring the security of all UNITA members in Luanda and other locations under the Government's control. In the meantime, in view of the prevailing insecurity throughout the country, I have instructed MONUA to further adjust its deployment on the ground; and I urge the parties to guarantee the security of all MONUA and other international personnel operating in Angola.

38. Having said this, I believe that in the present circumstances the international community should give the Angolan parties an additional chance to return to the peace process. Additional time is also needed to allow my new Special Representative to explore with the Government and UNITA effective ways and means of overcoming the current difficulties. I have instructed my Special Representative to undertake urgent consultations in this regard with all concerned. On this basis, I propose that the mandate of MONUA be extended until 31 January 1999, on the understanding that the Security Council would conduct a comprehensive review of the situation by the end of November 1998.

39. If, at the time of the November review, it appears that there has been no substantial progress towards full compliance by the parties with their

respective obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, MONUA would report this faithfully and clearly identify those responsible for the persisting deadlock. It would then be incumbent upon the Security Council to take the necessary action. In such a case, the reduction of MONUA would be accelerated with a view to closing it down by early February 1999. However, if decisive progress was made by the parties by the end of November, MONUA would be allowed to carry out its mandate. In addition, if, in consultation with the Government and UNITA, it appeared that additional resources would be required to enable MONUA to perform its residual tasks effectively, I would not hesitate to submit to the Security Council recommendations on its reconfiguration, as appropriate.

40. In conclusion, I should like to express my appreciation to the Force Commander of MONUA, Major-General Seth Kofi Obeng, who was designated Officer-in-Charge of MONUA and performed his duties with distinction during one of the most difficult periods in the peace process. I also wish to express my appreciation to my Representative and Regional Humanitarian Adviser for the Great Lakes region, Mr. Berhanu Dinka, who temporarily joined MONUA as Senior Political Adviser, as well as all MONUA personnel, the staff of United Nations programmes and agencies and non-governmental organizations for the courage and dedication they have demonstrated in performing their tasks. Needless to say, I trust that the Government and UNITA will extend to my new Special Representative all the necessary cooperation and support to enable him to assist the parties in achieving national reconciliation and stability.

## Annex

## The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola: contributions as at 1 September 1998

| | Military observers | Civilian police observers | Staff officers[a] | Troops | Grand total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | - | 15 | - | - | 15 |
| Bangladesh | 3 | 18 | 1 | - | 22 |
| Brazil | 4 | 13 | 2 | - | 19 |
| Bulgaria | 3 | 20 | - | - | 23 |
| Congo | 2 | - | - | - | 2 |
| Egypt | 3 | 19 | - | - | 22 |
| France | 3 | - | - | - | 3 |
| Gambia | - | 4 | - | - | 4 |
| Ghana | 3 | 6 | - | - | 9 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 2 | 4 | - | - | 6 |
| Hungary | 3 | 8 | - | - | 11 |
| India | 5 | 17 | 8 | 138 | 168 |
| Jordan | 3 | 26 | - | - | 29 |
| Kenya | 3 | 6 | - | - | 9 |
| Malaysia | 4 | 25 | - | - | 29 |
| Mali | 3 | 24 | - | - | 27 |
| Namibia | - | - | 2 | 138 | 140 |
| New Zealand | 3 | - | - | - | 3 |
| Nigeria | 4 | 21 | - | - | 25 |
| Norway | 3 | - | - | - | 3 |
| Pakistan | 3 | - | 1[b] | - | 4 |
| Poland | 4 | - | - | - | 4 |
| Portugal | 4 | 47 | 4 | 80 | 135 |
| Romania | - | - | 4 | 138 | 142 |
| Russian Federation | 3 | - | 3 | 100 | 106 |
| Senegal | 4 | - | - | - | 4 |

| | Military observers | Civilian police observers | Staff officers[a] | Troops | Grand total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Slovakia | 3 | - | - | - | 3 |
| Spain | - | 14 | - | - | 14 |
| Sweden | 3 | 19 | - | - | 22 |
| Ukraine | 3 | 5 | 1 | - | 9 |
| United Republic of Tanzania | - | 3 | - | - | 3 |
| Uruguay | 3 | 30 | 3 | - | 36 |
| Zambia | 3 | 23 | 8 | - | 34 |
| Zimbabwe | 3 | 22 | 4 | - | 29 |
| Total | 90 | 388 | 41 | 594 | 1 113 |

[a] Including Military Police.

[b] A military specialist in the Demining School.




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